US DOE/NNSA Second Line of Defense
Combating Illicit Trafficking:
Strategy, Technical Tools, and Outlook
2013

Briefing Structure

Program Mission and Strategy
Program Scope and Activities
International Coordination and Collaboration

Future Vision

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Second Line of Defense

Second Line of Defense:

Program Mission and Strategy
SLD mission is to strengthen the capabilities of partner countries to deter, detect,
and interdict illicit trafficking of special nuclear and other radioactive materials at
international border crossings, including border checkpoints, airports and
seaports, internal locations and other controlled land and maritime borders.
SLD strategy incorporates a threat-based, defense in depth approach to illicit
trafficking that recognizes:





Smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive materials is an ongoing global enterprise
Even a single, viable trafficking network constitutes a serious global security risk
There are currently gaps in the global radiation detection architecture
International coordination and collaboration is imperative to meeting global nuclear
security needs

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Second Line of Defense

Second Line of Defense:

Program Mission and Strategy
SLD develops partner countries’ capacity to reduce the risk of illicit
trafficking through:
• Deterrence of trafficking in special nuclear and other
radioactive materials by judicious deployment of
fixed and mobile radiation detection equipment.
Detection by instrument alarms and information alerts
including locating, identifying and securing of source during
alarm adjudication.
• Operational training, regulatory development, exercises
and support for interdiction of radioactive materials out
of regulatory control.
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Second Line of Defense

Second Line of Defense

Capacity Building Approach

PARTNER COUNTRY CAPACITY

SLD maintains
partner capacity
during
Sustainability
phase

SLD refreshes partner
capacity as necessary
during the posttransition phase

SLD builds partner
capacity during the
Implementation
phase

IMPLEMENTATION

SUSTAINABILITY
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POST-TRANSITION
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SLD Scope and Activities:

Implementation
 Installation of fixed radiation detection equipment at border checkpoints,
airports, feeder and large container seaports


Site Survey



Equipment Selection



Design and Permitting



Procurement



Construction / Installation of Equipment



Initial Operator and Maintenance Training



Testing

 Mobile radiation detection system (MDS) vans are custom designed and
assembled, and all include computer equipment and associated
communications systems for a site-level central alarm station (CAS)
 National Communications Systems link sites and provide near real time data
for management oversight of operations, maintenance, and reachback

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Second Line of Defense

Implementation:

Examples of Secondary Inspection
Equipment
ORTEC
Detective

Flir
IdentiFINDER

Health
and
Safety

Identify
Spectroscopic
Portal
Monitor

Sensor
Technology
Engineering
Radiation Pager
PRD

Search

TSA Survey
Meter
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Thermo Scientific PackEye
radiation detection backpack

Second Line of Defense

Implementation:

SLD Mobile Detection Systems (MDS)
 MDS complements fixed detection
equipment and are a critical component
of SLD’s layered, defense-in-depth
architecture
 Powerful nuclear security tool for border
controls and law enforcement
operations
 Along “green” borders


Response to intelligence or information
alert related to smuggling activity

 Law enforcement sting operations

Backpack

 Political boundaries where fixed
equipment installations are impractical,
unauthorized or unwanted.
 Temporary replacement for fixed RPM
installation
 Major public events

Roadside operations
(white van in foreground)

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Backpack used in field
training exercise

Second Line of Defense

Implementation:

National Communications System (NCS)

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Program Scope and Activities:

Sustainability
SLD works with partner countries to develop a sustainable system, supporting their transition (3 to 5
years) to assuming full operational and management responsibilities by providing assistance in the
following areas:

 Overall Guidance and Planning Support
 Assuming Maintenance Responsibilities
 Developing Indigenous Training Capacity
 Reviewing System Performance

 Encouraging Regional Cooperation
Help Desk trend analysis

Promotes long-term, proficient operations by partner countries
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Second Line of Defense

Sustainability

Training, Workshops and Field Exercises
• Multi-Phase training takes place both during and after
equipment installation
• SLD collaborates with European Commission Joint
Research Centre and IAEA on development and delivery
of training through a harmonized curricula

• Training available for Front Line Officers (CAS operators,
secondary inspection teams), Maintenance Personnel
and Instructors
• Bilateral and Regional Workshops on Sustainability, to
include regulations development, best practices sharing
• Field training exercises in collaboration with law
enforcement and other international organizations

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Second Line of Defense

International Coordination and
Collaboration
Partnering with international
terminal operators and other
industry leaders

Partner
Countries

Industry

Build nuclear detection
capability, workshops, exercises,
technical exchanges, regulatory
development

Partnering,
Cost-sharing,
and Technical
Exchanges
Technical exchanges, best
practices, CoE support, joint
training and consulting, joint
exercises, sustainability
partnerships

GNDA, GICNT, workshops
exercises, donor countries

US
Interagency

International
Organizations

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Second Line of Defense

International Coordination
and Collaboration
Border Monitoring Working Group (BMWG): Proven framework for
collaboration in and coordination of international assistance for nuclear
security implementation and sustainability activities

BMWG page on IAEA website

INTERPOL: SLD staff member detailed to INTERPOL in Lyon, France
EC-JRC and EURATOM: EUSECTRA (European Security Training) uses
HAMMER-like facilities for nuclear security training in Karlsruhe,
Germany and Ispra, Italy
International Guidance: SLD participates in development of international
guidance documents and training curricula by providing subject matter
experts to GICNT and IAEA

BMWG Mobile Workshop
(Warsaw 2012)

Forward Deployed: Five SLD personnel are forward-positioned (Sofia,
London, Tbilisi, Baku, Ispra/JRC)
EUSECTRA in Ispra

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Second Line of Defense

Technical Exchange
 Leverage 15 years international experience
deploying radiation detection systems to bolster
global capability to deter, detect, and interdict illicit
nuclear trafficking
 Build capacity through collaborative approach to
assist international partners to plan, implement,
and sustain radiation detection programs
 Deliver access to subject matter expert consultation
and collection of program tools (templates, best
practices, document samples) designed to aid
deployment process

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Second Line of Defense

Summary
SLD and the global community will optimize progress in
combating nuclear smuggling only if:
 Detection systems are effectively sustained through strong
joint maintenance and training efforts
 Information and experiences related to detection systems
are appropriately shared to facilitate improved monitoring
and deployment approaches
 Detection systems are effectively integrated into a partner
country, regional and global strategy for detecting illicit
trafficking

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Second Line of Defense

Contacts
Elly Melamed
Director, Office of Second Line of Defense
+1.202.586.2216
Elly.Melamed@nnsa.doe.gov

Allison Johnston
Deputy Director, Office of Second Line of Defense
+1.202.586.5661
Allison.Johnston@nnsa.doe.gov

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Second Line of Defense