Whether the soul can be a form and a particular thing
Whether the human soul, so far as its act of existing is concerned, is
separated from the body
Whether there is one possible intellect, or intellective soul, for all men
Whether it is necessary to admit that an agent intellect exists
Whether there is one separately existing agent intellect for all men
Whether the soul is composed of matter and form
Whether the angel and the soul are of different species
Whether the rational soul should be united to a body such as man
possesses
Whether the soul is united to corporeal matter through a medium
Whether the soul exists in the whole body and in each of its parts
Whether the rational, sentient, and vegetal souls in man are
substantially one and the same
Whether the soul is its powers
Whether the powers of the soul are distinguished from one another
by their objects
Whether the human soul is incorruptible
Whether the soul, when separated from the body, is capable of
understanding
Whether the soul, when united to the body, can understand separate
substances
Whether the soul, when separated from the body, can understand
separate substances
Whether the soul, when separated from the body, knows all natural
things
Whether the sentient powers remain in the soul when it exists apart
from the body
Whether the soul, when separated from the body, knows singular
things
Whether the soul, when separated from the body, can suffer
punishment by corporeal fire
ARTICLE 1
WHETHER THE SOUL CAN BE A FORM AND A PARTICULAR THING
[Summa theol., I, q.75, a.2;